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More than Altruism: Cultural Norms and Remittances among Hispanics in the U.S. 
Cultural norms embody the communalism and familism that characterize social structures 
and traditions of care among certain identity groups, notably, Hispanics. In turn, they affect 
remitting behavior as they do family dynamics, thereby extending care transnationally. Using the 
2006 Latino National Survey, the largest instrument that captures socio-economic variables and 
political perspectives among Hispanics residing in the U.S., we construct a Hispanic identity 
index that is used to capture the role of cultural norms in remittance behavior. This index is used 
as an explanatory variable in a logit model for the probability and frequency of remitting money. 
We find that both the probability and frequency of remitting increase with higher levels of self-
defined familism as reflected by the Hispanic index. This effect is stronger among males, renters, 
foreign-born non-U.S. citizens, and migrants with fewer years of residence in the U.S. 
Incorporating variables such as our Hispanic identity index may shed light on a relatively 
unexplored area in the field of economics that explains remitting behavior. 
 
Keywords 
Migration, Remittances, Familism, Latino Studies, Interdisciplinary Studies 
Introduction: Cultural norms matter 
The analysis of remittances and migration flows has experienced a refreshing 
paradigmatic change due to novel approaches. Contributions underscoring culture, institutions, 
and socio-political context are challenging neoclassical scholarship that underscored pure 
economic rationality to explain international migration and remittance behavior. In this paper, we 




remit money back home. Basically, migrants care for those left behind and they feel it is their 
obligation to transfer part of their income to their family and kin (Dennis et al. 2009; Rivera et al. 
2008; González et al. 2010; Sabogal et al. 1987). We argue that the behavior of Hispanics1, in 
particular first and second generations in the United States (U.S.), is influenced by familism2, a 
social structure that emphasizes the well-being of family and implies subjugation of the 
individual for the good of the nuclear and extended family. Omitting this understanding can lead 
to generalizations about financial motives for remitting grounded in individual interest rather 
than familism. Examples of such individual-based motives include payment of insurance policies 
to cover for the likelihood of returning back home and remaining on the “good side” of family, 
ensuring being a beneficiary of inheritance, profitable investment as asset owner or business 
partner, and payment of migration debts (incurred to fund the migration project). Other less self-
interested motives may include giving when the economy back at home is going through a 
downturn or when it is exposed to a natural disaster. While any or a combination of these 
motives may be consistent with migrants’ aspirations for their financial future, it is also true, as 
we show below, that emotional bonding with those left behind at home is important enough to 
send money.  
We argue that Hispanics’ strong sense of familism is reflected in their loyalty, solidarity, 
and identification with family. When migrants leave their hometowns, mostly for economic 
reasons, and find jobs in the U.S., they will continue their bond to family and transfer money 
frequently. Expanding the evidence drawn from a case study on familism and social inclusion in 
                                                             
1 According to the U.S. Census, Hispanics or Latinos are those people, of any race, who classified themselves in one 
of the specific Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino categories listed on the Census 2010 questionnaire or who indicated that 
they are of “another Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin.” We acknowledge the difficulties with this identity 
definition but nonetheless we use the category to refer to persons of Spanish or Hispanic cultural background.  
2 It may generate contradictory feelings of excessive burden and sacrifice due to financial or time commitments to 




New London3, Connecticut (Cruz-Saco and López-Anuarbe 2013), we assessed how familism, 
and the frequency and probability of remitting are highly associated. In the New London case 
study, approximately 150 surveyed Hispanic participants exhibited a high degree of familism 
within their own Hispanic residential communities (“barrio”) that sharply departed from feelings 
of exclusion in the larger, non-Hispanic society. Seventy percent of them remitted money, mostly 
to parents and relatives, and manifested obligation with family left behind. 
Using the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS)4, a comprehensive survey with 
approximately ten thousand responses, we construct a Hispanic identity index and find that we 
can’t reject the association between it and the probability and frequency of remitting. The LNS, 
containing over 100,000 observations and 165 items, provides crucial information on the 
migrants’ social and cultural views (proxies for cultural identity), reasons for coming to the U.S., 
and plans to go back. Our empirical findings provide evidence that an interdisciplinary approach 
to the study of Hispanic remittance behavior enhances our understanding of the role of cultural 
values in financial behavior. Furthermore, we believe that the findings in this paper may be 
applied to other cultural groups residing in the U.S., for example, migrants from Southeast Asian 
or Sub-Saharan countries who may share strong levels of familism. 
 
Review of relevant literature  
One stream of scholarship has looked at drivers and outcomes of international migration, 
impact on sending families, labor markets, and remittance behavior. A second stream has 
                                                             
3 A town of approximately 30 thousand residents (one third is of Hispanic background). 
4 The 2006 LNS is one of the largest, most representative data sets of Hispanics. It is a telephone-based survey that 
sampled 11 million Hispanic households residing in areas with 87.5% of the Hispanic population in the U.S. For a 
more detailed description of the data, please access the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 




analyzed gender relations and globalization forces, citizenship, exclusion, transnationalism, 
cultural norms, and intergenerational solidarity. Within the first stream, remittances have been 
considered the “other side of the migration coin” and models have estimated a variety of motives 
for remittances (Rapoport and Docquier 2006). They include altruism (willingness to raise 
family’s consumption level especially when family at home is hit by financial or natural 
hardship), self-interest and/or insurance (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006; Osaki 1999), 
repayment of educational expenses and loans at home (Hoddinott 1994), diversification of 
savings (Quinn 2005), responses to natural disasters (Stark and Lucas 1988) and desire to 
increase assets at home (Yang 2006, 2008). There is evidence that altruism, reciprocity or 
exchange, insurance, loan repayment, and investment in home countries explain both the flow of 
remittances and the probability to remit (Rapoport and Docquier 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo 2006; Stark and Lucas 1988; Osaki, 1999; Quinn 2005; Hoddinott 1994).  
In the second stream of scholarship, the literature has taken a gender approach to better 
understand the complex decision-making within the family, and how migration flows unfold in 
specific corridors given gender relations and migrants’ transnational networks (Hondagneu-
Sotelo, 1994, 1999; Göbel 2013; Karakaplan et al. 2011; IOM, 2010, 2011, 2013; Pessar 2006; 
Pfeiffer et al. 2008). In the words of Donato et al. (2006, p.6) “Scholars now analyze gender in 
the lives of both female and male migrants, in the politics and governance of migration, in the 
workplaces of immigrants, in neoliberal or welfare state policies toward migration or foreign-
born populations, in diasporas, and even in the capitalist world system.”  
Does gender affect the likelihood and frequency of remitting? Gender affects who 
migrates, why, how, and how much is remitted (IOM, 2011; Donato, Gabaccia, Holdaway, 




1994). The evidence, however, on whether women remit more is inconclusive because it is 
difficult to distinguish between the monetary and non-monetary contributions to family, and 
outmigration motives in a variety of corridors. Increasingly, women are migrating on their own 
for reasons other than family reunification, and remitting money to their relatives or managing 
remittances at home with greater autonomy (Castles and Miller 2009; Göbel 2013; Karakaplan 
2011; Orozco 2012; Donato, Hiskey, Durand and Massey 2010). Economists have incorporated 
gender as a control variable (Pfeiffer, Richter, Fletcher and Taylor 2008) and recently, models 
include gender relations more rigorously. The latter suggest that females are more altruistic given 
their caregiving responsibilities and, therefore, they have a higher propensity to remit. Their 
remittances are substantial in migration corridors where females work abroad (in South to South 
corridors between India and Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia, and the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine).  
In their pioneer paper, Stark and Lucas (1988) proposed that girls from Botswana were 
brought up with the expectation that they would pay their families back with remittances. Blue 
(2004) and Osaki (1999) showed that Cuban and Thai female immigrants respectively were more 
socially and morally obliged to families and remitted more. Similarly, Naufal (2008) showed that 
Nicaraguan females appeared to remit more than males. In contrast, Orozco, Lowell, and 
Schneider (2006) found that Latina migrants may remit less than males, but when they do, they 
remit to distant family members and help raise families above the poverty line. Against this 
evidence, a number of studies have shown that male migrants remit more for reasons that include 
motives for international out-migration, migration corridor and labor market constraints 




INSTRAW 2007; Bollard, Mckenzie, and Morten 2010; Bettin, Lucchetti, and Zazzaro 2009; 
Lozano-Ascencio 2005; Holst et al. 2012). 
Remittances of Hispanic migrants need to consider culturally specific values regarding 
family bonding and intergenerational solidarity. Family roles, from children and older persons to 
females and males, are framed by familism5 that delineates relative positions that family 
members have in the social network. These relationships have traditionally supported the 
resilience of Hispanic communities and helped them overcome socio-economic disadvantage and 
vulnerability through the establishment of networks of care (Bermúdez, Kirkpatrick, Hecker and 
Torres-Robles 2010; Radina & Barber 2004; Hilton, Gonzalez, Saleh, Maitoza and Annegela-
Cole 2012; Beyene, Becker and Mayan 2002). While Hispanics are neither a monolithic nor a 
homogenous group, on average, they have traditionally lagged behind the general population in 
household income, access to health insurance, quality education, and are more likely to live in 
poverty (U.S. Census 2010; Baker 2002). For these reasons, a cultural system that relies heavily 
on informal care networks is hard pressed to function effectively if resources are not available.  
For example, Hispanic children are expected to care for their senior aging parents. Burr 
and Mutchler (1999) found that, relative to white Anglo-Saxons, Hispanics and Asians were 
more likely to feel that parents should live with adult children in multigenerational households. 
There is also an important gender dimension to these circles of care. Males possess a cultural 
privilege, which means that caregiving falls predominantly on the shoulders of women (Brewer 
2001).  
The importance of the value of communalism among Hispanics expands the reach of 
social networks beyond parents, children, and siblings to other family members, friends, 
                                                             
5 While familism has been strongly associated with Hispanic cultures, Schwartz (2007) found familism evidence in 





neighbors, priests, and other members of the local community (Ruiz and Ransford 2012). The 
power of these social networks has been identified as a reason for the “barrio effect” that helps 
the livelihood of all ages, and especially, older persons (Aranda, Ray, Snih, Ottenbacher, and 
Markides 2011). Presently, the barrio effect transcends the local and includes the transnational 
family integrated through the internet.  
 A large proportion of Hispanics residing in the U.S. remits more than $55 billion to their 
home countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. These transfers are expected to reach $80 
billion in 2015, helped by the strengthening of international financial intermediation and the 
easing of transfer payments across borders (Yang 2011; World Bank 2014). While remittances 
represent a small proportion of national income in a relatively larger country, Mexico or Brazil 
for example, they represent a substantial addition to national income in smaller countries. These 
transfers often represent more than official development assistance and foreign investment 
combined. As a proportion of national income, remittances represent between 10% and 19% in 
Honduras, Guyana, El Salvador, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Guatemala (World Bank 2011).  
The literature on the macroeconomic impact of Hispanic remittances shows a significant 
positive correlation with per capita GDP and long-term economic growth (Fajnzylber and López 
2007; Ramírez and Sharma 2008; Mundaca 2009). Transfers have directly improved the 
formation of human capital through an increase in the coverage of educational services and better 
health care indicators of recipient communities (Cohen 2010). In addition, migrants’ relatives 
have invested in small businesses, generated employment, and expanded productive and income-
generating activities. In some countries, transfers have been accompanied by matching funds 
from local governments and financial organizations to develop small infrastructure projects 




from abroad has increased the stability of foreign exchange markets in recipient countries. While 
some voices have warned against “remittance addiction,”6 the macroeconomic impact of such 
transfers has been largely positive on the balance of payments of receiving countries. We 
anticipate that in the near future, these transfers will continue to increase consumption, 
investment, and help mobilize resources for economic growth (INSTRAW 2007; Maimbo and 
Rath, 2005; World Bank 2006; UN 2009; UNDP 2009; García-Fuentes and Kennedy 2009; 
Acosta et al. 2008). 
 
Why were cultural norms7 excluded from remittance behavior models? 
In the economics literature, individuals are assumed to understand their environment and 
behave in ways that ensure their well-being given anticipated behavior of others (Ermisch 2003). 
“Altruism” is equivalent to caring and love, it is caused by affection and empathy, and it is also 
the outcome of cultural norms (Cruz-Saco 2010). The well-being of the altruistic person depends 
on the welfare of the other, the beneficiary. However, evidence is mixed on the motives that 
persuade parents, for example, to fund their children’s education and health care. It is difficult to 
completely separate feelings of caring and love from image building, earning respect, wanting 
one’s descendants to do well, and, even expecting one’s descendants to reciprocate in the future. 
Altruism and the cultural norms of familism vary in that the latter brings to the forefront not just 
feelings of love and caring but the much larger characteristics of a cultural and ethnic identity. 
Since culture, tradition, and social norms lie at the foundation of the social structure that 
                                                             
6The term refers to a situation characterized by any of the following: a. Economies rely excessively on the influx of 
foreign exchange from the work of migrants abroad; b. Individuals of working age decide not to join the labor force 
in recipient countries due to rents received from relatives abroad; and c. Remittances may originate on “illegal” 
activities (“laundering”).  
7  Since cultural norms and traditions determine the social structure of familism, we will use the terms cultural norms 




identifies Hispanics as a community, where social bonding and intergenerational cohesion are 
particularly high, it is only natural to set these two concepts apart. Altruism continues to 
condition behavior in ways that are mixed or ambiguous because it is not possible to truly isolate 
love and caring from some form of self-interest and reciprocity. But familism and cultural norms 
are unambiguous traits of the Hispanic identity. 
In the case of economic remittance models, simplifying assumptions regarding migrants’ 
rational behavior are adopted. They postulate that a migrant’s own level of utility or satisfaction 
is based on her own consumption and the consumption of family back at home (an altruistic 
postulate). Given prices, maximizing satisfaction subject to a budgetary restriction helps allocate 
income between own consumption and remittances that help fund the consumption of family at 
home. Under this approach, a family contract ensures an income flow at home (Stark and Lucas 
1988). The contract is self-enforcing due to incentives such as promise of rewards upon return or 
support for family reunification abroad (Sana 2008). The option of social punishment through a 
network of other migrants from the same community helps discipline migrants’ behavior.  
Along this narrative, forces such as peer influence, herd behavior, chain migration, and 
the existence of transnational migration networks that provide opportunities for people to out-
migrate are excluded. These forces can also explain a migrant’s decision to leave. Additionally, 
excluded from the analysis are cultural, emotional, and social variables that do influence a 
migrant´s financial behavior (Boswell 2008; Boswell and Mueser 2008). These variables 
determine in distinctive ways how the culture of familism and social bonding characterizes 
Hispanic families. In Cruz-Saco and López-Anuarbe (2013) it was found that migrants remit 




Migrants’ strong cultural motivation to remit, however, has not been captured by rational 
economic models (Radu 2008; Haug 2008; Epstein 2008).  
The quantification of a highly complex social structure, such as cultural norms of 
communalism, is admittedly challenging and another reason why familism was not included in 
remittance behavior models. Often, data sets that contain mostly economic and financial 
variables will exclude indicators needed to construct a proxy. Some analysts have modeled 
cultural norms as intergenerational solidarity and use multivariate methods to measure family 
affection, association, norms, exchange and consensus, family ambiguity and conflict, attitudinal 
and behavioral patterns, degree of familism and assimilation (Bengtson and Mangen 1988; 
Mangen, Bengtson and Landry 1988). To add to this difficulty, although we refer to Hispanics as 
a common denominator, Hispanics are a heterogeneous and diverse population with notorious 
identity differences among sub-groups (Chicanos, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, 
Mexicans, Central and South Americans). Differences in identities originate in diverse socio-
historical and political conditions (Rivera et al. 2008; Oboler 1995) that are further complicated 
by their arrival date as migrants to the U.S., assimilation, their spatial distribution, and 
intermarriage with other ethnicities and racial groups in the U.S. (Portes et al. 2009; Allen et al. 
2011; Ellis and Almgren 2009). Although the U.S. Census has begun to use Hispanics or Latinos 
as if they were synonymous, Hispanics is a more narrow construction than Latinos or Latinas. 
The former is based on language, i.e., Spanish, and the later on geography, since it is based on 
the region of Latin America or Latin America and the Caribbean. There is an unavoidable 
political construction of these labels that confuses the identification of persons who speak 




problem: a large number of persons identified as Hispanics in the U.S. do not necessarily self-
identify this way. 
 
A remittance analytic framework based on cultural norms  
We contend that money transfers and sending gifts to relatives and friends abroad are 
motivated by the migrant´s desire to remain in regular contact despite time and distance, and to 
maintain their cultural identity by helping to improve the family’s well-being (Lindley, 2009; 
Taylor et al., 2012). Based on findings showing a high and direct association between familism 
and Hispanic identity (Calderón-Tena and Knight 2011; Desmond and López Turley 2009; Realo 
et al. 2008; Schwartz 2007; Taylor et al. 2012), we postulate that sense of obligation to provide 
for family that was instilled in migrants as small children explains the likelihood and the 
frequency of remittances. To assess this association, we construct a “Hispanic index” that will 
capture cultural norms and will be plugged as an explanatory variable into a reduced form for the 
likelihood, level, and frequency of remitting money back home. The following items in the 2006 
LNS8 were used for this measure: 
1. Do Hispanics strongly identify themselves as “Hispanics”, “Latino/as” 9or citizens of their 
home countries?  
2. Do Hispanics believe that it is important to maintain their distinct cultures?  
3. Do Hispanics believe it is important to speak Spanish at home? 
These questions explore the degree of identity of the respondent with being a member of the 
distinct Hispanic cultural grouping and acknowledging the relative importance of speaking 
Spanish at home. The index is the simple sum of the Likert scale scores of the three answers 
                                                             
8 Respondents self-identify as Latino/as or Hispanic. 




(0=not at all important, 1=somewhat important, 2=important, 3=very important). Appendix 1 
presents the frequency distribution of the Likert scale for each of these questions. Out of 5,703 
respondents, 91% consider that they identify as Hispanic (somewhat to very important); 97% 
consider that they should maintain their distinctive culture (somewhat to very important); and 
97% consider that maintaining Spanish at home is important (somewhat to very important). 
These percentages indicate a strong self-reported degree of identity with being Hispanic, further 
reflected in a mean value of 8.1 in a total of 9 maximum value in the combined Hispanic index 
(see Appendix 1). 
Following the standard utility maximization proposition that migrants’ utility is based on 
their own consumption and the utility of family members back home (Holst et al. 2011; López 
Anuarbe 2013) – which in the economic literature is considered an altruistic proposition, we 
argue that remittance behavior is contingent upon migrants’ consumption possibilities, their 
socio-economic conditions, and personal characteristics including most notably, the Hispanic 
index that captures Hispanic cultural norms. Thus, the altruistic, conventional specification of the 
migrant’s utility is enhanced with the addition of the Hispanic cultural norm variable. 
A utility maximization model is used to determine a migrant’s optimal level of 
remittances (R*). Controlling for personal characteristics and cultural norms, her utility level not 
only depends on her own consumption and leisure, but also on the utility level of her family 
abroad. Likewise, the family’s utility function depends on its own consumption, which increases 
when it receives remittances from a migrant relative. Remittances are endogenously determined 
and depend on cultural norms and a migrant’s socioeconomic and personal characteristics, such 




included as an argument in the model reflects how the cultural norms of being Hispanic or 
Latino/a affect remittance behavior. 
When solving to find an optimal level of remittances, we find that a migrant’s optimal 
level of remittances, R*, depends on the relative importance that the Hispanic index plays in her 
utility, the share size of her family utility compared to her own utility, her propensity to remit, 
her income level, and relative importance of her propensity to remit, which is directly affected by 
the impact of the utility of the family abroad on her own. Likewise, her R* is negatively 
impacted by the migrant’s propensity to consume, the cost of her consumption basket, and the 
cost of remittances. An explicit layout of the framework can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Empirical Strategy and Data 
 
When transitioning to an empirical estimation, we estimated the probability of migrants 
giving remittances to their families in their countries of origin and which variables affect this 
likelihood. A logit equation is used to answer our research question and determine the marginal 
effects of each independent variable on either remitting or not remitting and frequency. 
Our estimation equation can be summarized as: 
(1) R(0,1)= f( pf, se, HI, mc) +e 
where, 
R(0,1) is the probability that a migrant sends remittances to their home country; 
pf is a vector of personal and family demographic characteristics such as age, gender, 




se is a vector of socio-economic characteristics such as education level, household 
income level, employment status, and home ownership. It would be ideal to have access to 
an individual income variable with actual dollar values, but the LNS only provides a 
household income variable with seven pre-determined income categories: less than $15,000; 
between $15,000 and $25,000; between $25,000 and $35,000; between $35,000 and 
$45,000; between $45,000 and $55,000; between $55,000 and $65,000 and over $65,000. 
Moreover, our education level index has 5 levels: 1) Didn’t finish high school; 2) Finished 
High School; 3) Attended some College; 4) Obtained a College degree; 5) Obtained an 
advanced degree; 
HI is a Hispanic familism Index (that ranges between 0 and 9) which captures how 
respondents identify with their Hispanic culture (as explained earlier). The higher HI, the 
stronger the migrant’s ties with her culture and family; 
mc is a vector of migrant characteristics such as country of origin (ancestry), years lived 
in the U.S., citizenship status and plans to return to country of origin; and 
e is an error term. 
We anticipate that the likelihood of sending remittances increases when the migrant has 
children abroad, a higher Hispanic Index, is employed, does not own a home in the U.S., plans 
to return to their home country, has lived fewer years in the U.S, and is not a U.S. citizen. For 
the binary model, we use an item on the Latino National Survey (LNS) which asks: “How often 
do you send money (to your home country)?” to reflect the frequency of remitting. If the 
respondent answered ‘Never’, our binary Remittance variable equals zero, and one otherwise. 




The Latino National Survey (LNS), one of the largest data sets of self-identified Latino/Hispanic 
residents in the U.S, allows us to study the remittance behavior of Hispanics. This instrument 
sampled 11 million Hispanic households residing in areas where 87.5 percent of the Hispanic 
population resided in the U.S in 2006.10 The survey consists of interviews that contained 
approximately 165 distinct items ranging from demographic to political attitudes and policy 
preferences. It also provides information on the migrants’ social and cultural views, reasons for 
coming to the U.S. and their plans to go back. 
In addition to analyzing the entire sample and controlling for personal and socioeconomic 
characteristics, sub-samples that focused on gender, place of birth, and citizenship were also 
created. In particular, we were interested in becoming more familiarized with each sub-group 
and estimating and separating the effect of familism on remittance likelihood, frequency, and 
amount for men, women, U.S.-born respondents, and U.S. and non-U.S. citizens. These 
categories are presented separately in columns of Table 1 (mean and standard deviation are 
included). 
As can be seen in Table 1, nearly 52% of the sample (5,703 individuals) remitted an 
average of about $371. The reported remittance amount varied sharply with standard deviations 
that were almost three times the mean values. The LNS question is (TRMONAMT): “What is the 
average amount you send each time?” Answers led to a wide range of values that too often were 
not consistent with reported income levels. Values were either over-valuations given reported 
income levels or under-valuations probably due to fear of perceived repercussions for 
transferring monies abroad. For a distribution of sent remittances, please refer to Appendix 3. 
                                                             
10 Description of the data is found at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, LNS 2006 




U.S.-born Hispanics had the lowest likelihood of remitting (23%), a result that is fairly 
consistent with expectations about the bonding with family left behind. Non-U.S.-born, non-U.S. 
citizens will have a larger probability of remitting to their homeland than U.S.-born Hispanics 
who may have most of their family living with them, or who may have assimilated into the 
American culture and may be second generation (or higher) Hispanic Americans. When they did, 
however, U.S.-born Hispanics remitted a larger amount on average than their counterparts, 
perhaps reflecting a more advantageous socio-economic status. Even when non-U.S. citizens had 
no children abroad, over 71% of these Hispanics sent remittances to their countries (51% if male 
and 47% if female).  
Our Hispanic index averaged 8.1 for the entire sample (the maximum is 9), was 
statistically significant in all cases, was slightly smaller for US-born Hispanics (7.8), higher for 
non-U.S. citizens who were female, and had significantly smaller standard deviations than our 
other variables.  
Table 1. Sample Summary Statistics  































             
Remittance 
(who remit) 
0.515 0.50 0.486 0.50 0.233 0.42 0.711 0.453 0.469 0.499 0.506 0.500 
Hispanic 
Identity Index 
8.131 1.19 8.121 1.20 7.849 1.44 8.210 1.051 8.239 1.078 7.982 1.316 
Age 38.41 12.14 38.52 12.34 38.12 12.92 35.36 10.76 38.94 12.13 38.02 12.57 
Education 
Level Index 
3.764 1.91 3.843 1.89 4.719 1.49 2.999 1.839 3.788 1.891 3.908 1.889 
Household 
Income Index 
2.531 2.03 2.621 2.05 3.535 2.04 1.646 1.599 2.340 1.991 2.951 2.061 
 % of men 0.469 0.50 0.460 0.498 0.473 0.499 0.464 0.499     
Observations 5,703  3,246  1,634  2,055  2,834  2,412  
Remittance 
Amount ($) 




Observations 2,938  2,550  381  1,462  1,329  1,221  
Source: 2006 LNS, authors’ calculations. 
Findings and discussion   
Our results suggest that Hispanic identity – measured as an index that includes the 
practice of speaking Spanish at home, identifying oneself as Hispanic or Latino/a, and believing 
that it is important to maintain a distinct Hispanic culture in the United States – is a statistically 
significant (1%) explanatory variable that influences the probability of remitting. Specifically, a 
higher value of Hispanic identity increases the probability of sending remittances by 5.07% for 
the entire sample. This percentage increases to 5.79% if the sample is entirely male and smaller, 
and decreases to 4.86%, if the sample is entirely female (see Table 2, row 1, first, sixth and fifth 
columns respectively). 
(Insert Table 2 around here) 
Though having children abroad is certainly a reason to remit and a statistically significant 
variable, a higher Hispanic identity index increases the probability of remitting when there are no 
children outside of the U.S. for the entire sample (5.12%), and controlling for citizenship status 
(4.94% for U.S. citizens and 3.19% for non-U.S. citizens, respectively). A stronger Hispanic 
index also increases the frequency of remitting by 13% for the entire sample, 14.7% for the male 
sample and 15.2% for the U.S. citizen without a child abroad, further corroborating the 
importance of this index (see Table 3). 
(Insert Table 3 around here) 
Naturally, not having income or being unemployed decreases the probability of remitting, 




estimations. When looking at the entire sample, a higher level of household income decreases the 
probability and frequency of remitting by 1.65% and 4.47%, respectively; a higher level of 
education also reduces the probability and frequency of remitting by 1.83% and 4.29%, 
respectively. It is not uncommon for high income and well-educated Hispanics living in the U.S. 
to also have high income and well-educated relatives abroad who do not need any financial 
support. Also, renters, who are presumed to have a lower income level or may be unsure about 
permanently living in a specific town, remit with a higher likelihood and more frequently. 
In addition to income levels, birthplace and number of years residing in the U.S. also 
matter when remitting. Non U.S.-born Hispanics, regardless of U.S. citizenship, and respondents 
who have lived fewer years in the U.S. have a higher probability and frequency of remitting 
money compared to U.S.-born Hispanics who reside in the U.S. For example, living one 
additional year in the U.S. reduces the probability and frequency of remitting by 7.04% and 
14.8%, respectively. This result is further enhanced if the sample is male, as males living one 
additional year in the U.S. are 15.4% less likely to remit, but does not apply to females since this 
coefficient, though negatively signed, is statistically insignificant. A larger degree of assimilation 
to the U.S. culture may be present the longer someone lives in the country, especially for males. 
Likewise, a foreign-born U.S. citizen is 14.4% more likely to remit –and will do so 54.3% more 
frequently – than a U.S.-born Hispanic, while a foreign-born non-U.S. citizen is 22.6% more 
likely to remit and will do so 74.4% more frequently than a U.S.-born Hispanic. 
When analyzing the 2006 LNS sample by country of origin, or region and state of 
residence, we find that, compared to Mexicans, Central Americans are over 18% more likely to 
remit and over 42% more frequently. Remittances in some Central American countries 




sixth of its GDP (Anzoategui et al. 2011; World Bank 2013). Moreover, compared to the state of 
Iowa11, residents of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas are less likely to remit and do so 
less frequently. This result suggests that states with a high proportion of Hispanics may have 
more organized diasporas and relatives living in the U.S., thus reducing the need to send 
remittances. Also, it is noteworthy that the coefficients on Perú and Central American countries 
are positive and statistically significant in contrast to other countries where coefficients are not 
(with positive or negative sign). This finding may illustrate the fact that migrants from these 
countries have moved to the U.S. for economic reasons and hold strong values of familism 
affecting their remittance behavior.  
By linking and including cultural identity as a proxy for a familism index that serves as 
an additional explanatory variable and reason to remit, we suggest that transnational bonding and 
systems of support go beyond altruism and migrants’ socio-economic personal characteristics. 
As more comprehensive datasets with targeted questions that aren’t usually asked surface, it will 
be easier to construct a richer and more precise familism index. 
Conclusion 
Using the LNS (2006) survey, the most comprehensive instrument on Hispanics in the 
U.S. describing a range of indicators from socio-economic and demographic to political 
attitudes, we show that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that Hispanic identity reflecting 
cultural norms affects remittance behavior. This finding is consistent with behavioral science 
literature in which subjugation of self to family and tight social networks are high among 
Hispanics and affect cultural, economic, emotional, and social responses.  
                                                             
11 STATA randomly chose Iowa as the baseline state. However, compared to AZ, CO, NM and TX, Iowa has a 




To construct a Hispanic identity index, we used three survey items that measure how 
strongly respondents identify as “Hispanics” or “Latino/as”, how important is maintenance of 
their distinct culture, and how important is use of Spanish at home. We estimated a logit 
remittance equation controlling for our Hispanic identity index and other personal characteristics. 
Our findings consistently show that the probability and frequency of remitting increase with 
higher levels of Hispanic identity that is stronger among males, renters, foreign-born and non-
U.S. citizens, and migrants with fewer years of residence in the U.S. Furthermore, compared to 
Mexicans, Central Americans and Peruvians are more likely to remit and remit more frequently. 
Being unemployed, living more years in the U.S., and being more educated reduce both the 
probability and frequency of remitting.  
We have reinterpreted that remitting is an expression of bonding and care for family left 
behind as more than 71% of respondents of any gender remit because they care. This cultural 
characteristic had been omitted in labor migration economic studies that define remitting 
behavior as being solely determined by economic motives. It is possible that the influence of 
cultural values may also be important in helping explain remittances in other national groups 
residing in the U.S., for example, Southeast Asian and Sub-Saharan migrants. We look forward 
to exploring this subject further and to find additional links between cultural norms and identity 
on one side, and remittance behavior on the other. 
To support the increased transnationalism of Hispanic families, public policies should 
attempt to further reduce the transaction costs of remittances and provide opportunities for 
collective remittances such as the 3 X 1 programs in Mexico. In the latter, home associations 




remittance operator) and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the 
IADB (InterAmerican Development Bank).  
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Table 2. Logit Results on Probability of Sending Remittances 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All NoKidsAbroad CitizenNoKids NonCitizen 
NoKids 
Female Male 
       
Hispanic Identity Index 0.0507*** 0.0512*** 0.0494*** 0.0319*** 0.0486*** 0.0579*** 
 (0.00710) (0.00728) (0.00862) (0.00841) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
Age/10 0.0302 0.0309 -0.0772 0.207*** -0.0139 0.122* 
 (0.0458) (0.0465) (0.0583) (0.0542) (0.0634) (0.0715) 
Age Squared/100 -0.0097* -0.0099* 0.0033 -0.0281*** -0.0052 -0.0194** 
 (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0076) (0.0066) (0.0079) (0.0087) 
Ln(Years in the U.S.) -0.0704*** -0.0726***  -0.109*** -0.0238 -0.154*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0163)  (0.0178) (0.0212) (0.0279) 
Household Size 0.0175*** 0.0194*** 0.0260*** 0.00827 0.0305*** 0.0074 
 (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0065) (0.0063) (0.0075) (0.0084) 
Have Kids Abroad 0.209***      
 (0.0301)      
Education -0.0183*** -0.0177*** -0.0147* -0.0156*** -0.0118* -0.0245*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00517) (0.0076) (0.0056) (0.0070) (0.0079) 
Household Income -0.0165*** -0.0167*** -0.0105* -0.0181*** -0.0119* -0.0228*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0072) (0.0077) 
Citizenship Status       
Puerto Rican Born -0.0461 -0.0387   -0.0288 -0.0592 
 (0.0513) (0.0515)   (0.0664) (0.0843) 
Foreign Born Citizen 0.144*** 0.143***  -0.0421* 0.193*** 0.0497 
 (0.0330) (0.0349)  (0.0227) (0.0463) (0.0568) 
Foreign Born Non Citizen 0.226*** 0.219***   0.302*** 0.0808 
 (0.0382) (0.0400)   (0.0517) (0.0662) 
Housing       
Other Setting -0.0820 -0.0947* -0.0733 -0.0922 -0.0617 -0.135 
 (0.0530) (0.0534) (0.0467) (0.0666) (0.0698) (0.0873) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All NoKidsAbroad CitizenNoKids NonCitizen 
NoKids 
Female Male 
Rental 0.0539*** 0.0442** -0.00467 0.0627*** 0.0300 0.0639** 
 (0.0187) (0.0192) (0.0241) (0.0212) (0.0258) (0.0294) 
Ancestry       
Colombia -0.00300 0.00319 0.100 -0.0433 0.0523 -0.0664 
 (0.0536) (0.0555) (0.150) (0.0570) (0.0716) (0.0924) 
Cuba -0.0206 -0.0326 -0.0131 -0.0499 0.0205 -0.0879 
 (0.0470) (0.0475) (0.0621) (0.0545) (0.0692) (0.0677) 
Dominican Republic 0.0594 0.0521 0.0178 0.0173 0.0968* 0.00338 




Don’t Know -0.0587 -0.0815 -0.0881 -0.105 -0.0735 -0.0200 
 (0.153) (0.154) (0.102) (0.269) (0.179) (0.319) 
Ecuador 0.0951 0.125 0.580*** 0.0327 0.188* 0.0703 
 (0.0736) (0.0804) (0.208) (0.0757) (0.112) (0.115) 
Other South American -0.00226 -0.0130 0.461* -0.0715 -0.103 0.214** 
 (0.0602) (0.0613) (0.271) (0.0638) (0.0725) (0.0877) 
Peru 0.0966 0.0881 0.397 0.00446 0.200** -0.108 
 (0.0753) (0.0788) (0.265) (0.0754) (0.0976) (0.120) 
Puerto Rico -0.0517 -0.0566 -0.0222 -0.177 0.00964 -0.152** 
 (0.0435) (0.0432) (0.0380) (0.244) (0.0594) (0.0646) 
Central America 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.247*** 0.122*** 0.186*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0283) (0.0309) (0.0937) (0.0271) (0.0440) (0.0440) 
Marital Status       
Divorced (0,1) 0.0384 0.0339 0.0338 0.0303 0.0621 0.0431 
 (0.0350) (0.0365) (0.0483) (0.0424) (0.0457) (0.0634) 
Married (0,1) 0.0492** 0.0492** 0.0146 0.0446* 0.0966*** 0.0132 
 (0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0267) (0.0270) (0.0302) (0.0360) 
Married Spouse Apart (0,1) 0.103** 0.100** 0.131* 0.0682 0.170*** 0.0104 
 (0.0406) (0.0439) (0.0767) (0.0448) (0.0529) (0.0776) 
Not Married with Family (0,1) 0.0821** 0.0787** 0.0653 0.0598 0.133*** 0.0590 
 (0.0355) (0.0374) (0.0579) (0.0384) (0.0485) (0.0601) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




Widowed (0,1) -0.0206 -0.00697 0.0159 0.00826 0.0251 0.000148 
 (0.0699) (0.0711) (0.127) (0.0770) (0.0855) (0.137) 
Male (0,1) 0.0466*** 0.0355** -0.00768 0.0570***   
 (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0210) (0.0195)   
Employment Status       
Part-time Worker (0,1) -0.0455* -0.0484** 0.0155 -0.0716** -0.0662** -0.0200 
 (0.0232) (0.0236) (0.0289) (0.0286) (0.0300) (0.0393) 
Not in the labor Force (0,1) -0.117*** -0.112*** -0.0504 -0.107*** -0.129*** -0.0548 
 (0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0318) (0.0316) (0.0289) (0.0554) 
Unemployed (0,1) -0.129*** -0.121*** -0.0518 -0.136*** -0.142*** -0.0553 
 (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0357) (0.0371) (0.0326) (0.0676) 
Respondent’s State       
Arkansas 0.0701 0.0676 0.108 0.00870 0.0265 0.120 
 (0.0520) (0.0546) (0.0882) (0.0604) (0.0770) (0.0758) 
Arizona -0.174*** -0.177*** -0.0560 -0.234*** -0.204*** -0.136* 
 (0.0486) (0.0468) (0.0482) (0.0671) (0.0596) (0.0751) 
California -0.0269 -0.0328 -0.0149 -0.0483 -0.0875 0.0446 
 (0.0431) (0.0437) (0.0503) (0.0528) (0.0596) (0.0635) 
Colorado -0.108** -0.123** -0.0442 -0.153** -0.138* -0.0929 




Connecticut -0.0554 -0.0616 0.00590 -0.0715 -0.0990 0.0128 
 (0.0601) (0.0606) (0.0777) (0.0874) (0.0792) (0.0948) 
Florida -0.0617 -0.0576 0.0190 -0.0929 -0.117* 0.0242 
 (0.0502) (0.0506) (0.0733) (0.0630) (0.0663) (0.0772) 
Georgia 0.0499 0.0319 0.119 -0.0353 0.0141 0.0568 
 (0.0554) (0.0578) (0.0957) (0.0662) (0.0810) (0.0844) 
Illinois 0.0872* 0.0772 0.140* -0.0131 0.0357 0.124* 
 (0.0459) (0.0482) (0.0767) (0.0568) (0.0702) (0.0653) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES All NoKidsAbroad CitizenNoKids NonCitizen 
NoKids 
Female Male 
Massachusetts -0.0576 -0.0633 0.151 -0.0979 -0.0460 -0.125 
 (0.0601) (0.0606) (0.116) (0.0833) (0.0820) (0.0926) 
Maryland -0.0202 -0.0227 0.0623 -0.0644 -0.0695 0.00307 
 (0.0669) (0.0686) (0.129) (0.0778) (0.0946) (0.101) 
North Carolina 0.0420 0.0467 0.0588 0.0202 0.0876 0.0185 
 (0.0550) (0.0578) (0.0926) (0.0617) (0.0849) (0.0812) 
New Jersey 0.0669 0.0667 -0.0240 0.0955* 0.0837 0.0637 
 (0.0555) (0.0580) (0.0720) (0.0577) (0.0809) (0.0856) 
New Mexico -0.153*** -0.169*** -0.0714* -0.190** -0.169*** -0.183** 
 (0.0510) (0.0487) (0.0433) (0.0761) (0.0636) (0.0775) 
Nevada 0.0148 0.000538 -0.00130 -0.0317 0.0646 -0.0468 
 (0.0509) (0.0521) (0.0698) (0.0594) (0.0764) (0.0728) 
New York 0.0302 0.0329 0.0615 0.000636 -0.00643 0.0766 
 (0.0511) (0.0528) (0.0772) (0.0620) (0.0732) (0.0773) 
Rhode Island -0.0345 -0.0402 -0.00110 -0.0378 -0.0739 -0.00724 
 (0.0586) (0.0594) (0.0934) (0.0706) (0.0780) (0.0939) 
Texas -0.120*** -0.129*** -0.0547 -0.158*** -0.115* -0.152** 
 (0.0447) (0.0439) (0.0444) (0.0599) (0.0609) (0.0649) 
Virginia -0.000746 -0.0140 -0.0117 -0.0268 -0.0290 -0.0480 
 (0.0744) (0.0754) (0.113) (0.0849) (0.106) (0.112) 
Washington -0.0689 -0.0614 -0.00126 -0.0893 -0.120* 0.0205 
 (0.0513) (0.0520) (0.0630) (0.0653) (0.0684) (0.0772) 
       
Observations 5,703 5,246 1,634 3,191 2,834 2,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.221 0.200 0.141 0.112 0.178 0.249 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 3. Tobit Results on Remittance Frequency 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







       
Hispanic Identity Index 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.152*** 0.111*** 0.118*** 0.147*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0159) (0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0233) (0.0218) 
Age/10 0.0605 0.0536 -0.257 0.615*** -0.0520 0.255* 
 (0.0995) (0.101) (0.170) (0.152) (0.141) (0.146) 
Age Squared/100 -0.0233* -0.0225* 0.0128 -0.0868*** -0.0115 -0.0436** 
 (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.0220) (0.0186) (0.0175) (0.0180) 
Ln(Years in the U.S.) -0.148*** -0.157***  -0.330*** -0.0562 -0.263*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0333)  (0.0457) (0.0463) (0.0485) 
Household Size 0.0395*** 0.0421*** 0.0780*** 0.0158 0.0633*** 0.0216 
 (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0195) (0.0173) (0.0165) (0.0167) 
Have Kids Abroad 0.468***      
 (0.0708)      
Education -0.0429*** -0.0425*** -0.0467** -0.0503*** -0.0281* -0.0581*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0224) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0158) 
Household Income -0.0447*** -0.0439*** -0.0450** -0.0515*** -0.0296* -0.0597*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0184) (0.0172) (0.0159) (0.0161) 
Citizenship Status       
Puerto Rican Born -0.0189 -0.0228   -0.0307 0.0778 
 (0.114) (0.115)   (0.151) (0.186) 
Foreign Born Citizen 0.543*** 0.477***  -0.198*** 0.562*** 0.401*** 
 (0.0877) (0.0897)  (0.0630) (0.128) (0.127) 
Foreign Born Non Citizen 0.744*** 0.666***   0.822*** 0.502*** 
 (0.0918) (0.0976)   (0.139) (0.137) 
Housing       
Other Setting -0.0752 -0.110 -0.230 -0.0900 -0.0557 -0.156 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







 (0.115) (0.118) (0.171) (0.177) (0.159) (0.179) 
Rental 0.153*** 0.130*** 0.00745 0.234*** 0.108* 0.169*** 
 (0.0409) (0.0420) (0.0727) (0.0601) (0.0573) (0.0616) 
Ancestry       
Colombia 0.0361 0.0375 0.416 -0.116 0.163 -0.0938 
 (0.120) (0.125) (0.438) (0.152) (0.171) (0.189) 
Cuba -0.0826 -0.0917 0.000672 -0.205 0.0241 -0.197 
 (0.102) (0.103) (0.191) (0.140) (0.158) (0.135) 




 (0.0936) (0.0964) (0.203) (0.127) (0.132) (0.149) 
Don't Know -0.206 -0.277 -0.459 -0.424 -0.171 -0.400 
 (0.312) (0.312) (0.363) (0.612) (0.378) (0.586) 
Ecuador 0.224 0.285 1.775* 0.0726 0.384 0.221 
 (0.166) (0.186) (0.913) (0.217) (0.281) (0.248) 
Other South American -0.0647 -0.0826 1.093 -0.336** -0.254 0.382 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.744) (0.152) (0.156) (0.256) 
Peru 0.314* 0.283 1.306 0.0961 0.678** -0.256 
 (0.188) (0.188) (0.810) (0.218) (0.285) (0.225) 
Puerto Rico -0.124 -0.134 -0.0316 -0.374 0.0240 -0.336*** 
 (0.0949) (0.0943) (0.118) (0.570) (0.136) (0.129) 
Central America 0.424*** 0.435*** 0.675*** 0.451*** 0.471*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0702) (0.0760) (0.248) (0.0937) (0.113) (0.102) 
Marital Status       
Divorced (0,1) 0.0992 0.0871 0.122 0.0848 0.167 0.126 
 (0.0810) (0.0836) (0.138) (0.129) (0.109) (0.142) 
Married (0,1) 0.114** 0.116** 0.0360 0.139* 0.265*** -0.0113 
 (0.0468) (0.0482) (0.0798) (0.0722) (0.0667) (0.0717) 
Married Spouse Apart (0,1) 0.286*** 0.299*** 0.413** 0.276* 0.518*** 0.0593 
 (0.0984) (0.108) (0.209) (0.149) (0.150) (0.158) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







Not Married with Family (0,1) 0.154** 0.165** 0.173 0.148 0.382*** 0.00623 
 (0.0787) (0.0832) (0.159) (0.115) (0.122) (0.117) 
Widowed (0,1) -0.0396 0.00607 -0.0493 0.0878 0.0992 0.0442 
 (0.154) (0.162) (0.340) (0.244) (0.204) (0.303) 
Male (0,1) 0.123*** 0.0940** -0.0181 0.199***   
 (0.0360) (0.0371) (0.0627) (0.0546)   
Employment Status       
Part-time Worker (0,1) -0.102** -0.103** 0.0506 -0.197*** -0.141** -0.0398 
 (0.0476) (0.0494) (0.0846) (0.0713) (0.0643) (0.0776) 
Not in the labor Force (0,1) -0.277*** -0.262*** -0.127 -0.335*** -0.281*** -0.201* 
 (0.0515) (0.0524) (0.102) (0.0765) (0.0616) (0.111) 
Unemployed (0,1) -0.281*** -0.275*** -0.157 -0.390*** -0.296*** -0.191 
 (0.0571) (0.0594) (0.118) (0.0834) (0.0686) (0.128) 
Respondent’s State       
Arkansas 0.0989 0.0974 0.273 -0.0143 0.0226 0.206 
 (0.115) (0.118) (0.235) (0.157) (0.162) (0.174) 
Arizona -0.348*** -0.362*** -0.156 -0.556*** -0.445*** -0.241 
 (0.0971) (0.0975) (0.163) (0.137) (0.129) (0.149) 
California -0.0961 -0.105 -0.0699 -0.160 -0.248** 0.0865 
 (0.0888) (0.0902) (0.152) (0.128) (0.121) (0.135) 




 (0.104) (0.104) (0.167) (0.156) (0.146) (0.151) 
Connecticut -0.165 -0.174 -0.0814 -0.225 -0.291* 0.0235 
 (0.118) (0.122) (0.217) (0.200) (0.157) (0.198) 
Florida -0.116 -0.112 0.0147 -0.185 -0.274** 0.0917 
 (0.102) (0.105) (0.206) (0.148) (0.136) (0.164) 
Georgia 0.0615 0.0365 0.317 -0.118 -0.0206 0.101 
 (0.117) (0.120) (0.257) (0.158) (0.168) (0.171) 
Illinois 0.221** 0.192* 0.371* 0.00963 0.0744 0.330** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.204) (0.150) (0.155) (0.161) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 








Massachusetts -0.140 -0.158 0.318 -0.265 -0.135 -0.274 
 (0.120) (0.123) (0.290) (0.188) (0.169) (0.173) 
Maryland -0.0417 -0.0444 0.160 -0.170 -0.165 0.0290 
 (0.130) (0.136) (0.356) (0.177) (0.190) (0.190) 
North Carolina 0.0563 0.0473 0.0929 0.0170 0.0163 0.103 
 (0.115) (0.119) (0.245) (0.160) (0.171) (0.167) 
New Jersey 0.127 0.133 -0.113 0.302 0.129 0.158 
 (0.127) (0.131) (0.218) (0.195) (0.181) (0.192) 
New Mexico -0.328*** -0.355*** -0.251* -0.348** -0.358*** -0.374** 
 (0.101) (0.101) (0.146) (0.170) (0.135) (0.151) 
Nevada 0.0285 -0.0117 0.0181 -0.0948 0.0963 -0.0827 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.212) (0.148) (0.168) (0.144) 
New York 0.0444 0.0487 0.112 0.00406 -0.0733 0.181 
 (0.110) (0.113) (0.206) (0.162) (0.151) (0.169) 
Rhode Island -0.101 -0.104 -0.0199 -0.141 -0.205 0.00706 
 (0.117) (0.121) (0.282) (0.171) (0.158) (0.188) 
Texas -0.281*** -0.307*** -0.180 -0.434*** -0.276** -0.356*** 
 (0.0876) (0.0878) (0.145) (0.126) (0.125) (0.122) 
Virginia 0.0248 0.0131 0.00572 0.00148 -0.0548 -0.0192 
 (0.151) (0.156) (0.347) (0.212) (0.224) (0.206) 
Washington -0.163 -0.157 0.00687 -0.264* -0.324** 0.0704 
 (0.103) (0.106) (0.189) (0.148) (0.138) (0.165) 
       
Observations 5,703 5,246 1,634 3,191 2,834 2,412 
Pseudo R-squared 0.106 0.0962 0.0817 0.0491 0.0833 0.122 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 






APPENDIX 1: HISPANIC INDEX FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION AND CORRELATION 
COEFFICIENT MATRIX 
Hispanic Index = Hispanic Identity + Distinct Culture + Speak Spanish  
Key Variables: 
Hispanic Identity (LAIDENT) 
[In general,] how strongly or not do you think of yourself as Hispanic or Latino? 
0 = Not at all 
1 = Not very strongly 
2 = Somewhat strongly 
3 = Very strongly 
 
Distinct Culture (DISTINCT) 
[In general,] how important is it for you and your family to maintain your distinct cultures? 
0 = Not at all  
1= Not very important 
2 = Somewhat important 
3 = Very important 
 
Speak Spanish at Home (KEEPSPAN)  
[In general], how important do you think it is for you or your family to maintain the ability to 
speak Spanish at home? 
0 = Not at all important 
1 = Not very important 

















 Freq. Percent Freq. Percent Freq. Percent 
Not at all important (0) 58 1.02 179 3.14   
Not very important (1) 109 1.91 331 5.8 157 2.75 
Somewhat important 
(2) 668 11.71 1,416 24.83 968 16.97 
Very important (3) 4,868 85.36 3,777 66.23 4,578 80.27 
Total 5,703 100 5,703 100 5,703 100 
 
 
Index Freq. Percent 
1 3 0.05 
2 8 0.14 
3 21 0.37 
4 52 0.91 
5 136 2.38 
6 357 6.26 
7 720 12.62 
8 1,436 25.18 
9 2,970 52.08 
total 5703 100.00 
 
Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
 Keep Spanish 
Hispanic 
Identity Distinct Culture 
Keep Spanish 1   
Hispanic identity 0.176 1  









Appendix 2: A Utility Maximization Analytical Framework 
 
 
A utility maximization model is used to determine a migrant’s optimal level of 
remittances (R*). Controlling for personal characteristics (vector Z), their 
utility or satisfaction level (UM) not only depends on his or her own 
consumption (X) and leisure levels (N), but also on the utility level of their 
family abroad (UF).  
 
(1) UM = UM [XM, N, UF , Z]  
 
Likewise, the family’s utility function (UF) depends on their own consumption 
levels, which increase when they receive remittances from their migrant 
relative. Remittances are endogenously determined and depend on the 
Hispanic migrant’s socioeconomic and personal characteristics, such as age, 
gender, income level, marital status, and familism (FH). We theoretically and 
empirically construct a Hispanic identity index that links and relates familism 
to cultural identity, specifically, identifying as a Hispanic, Latino/a or from 
their country of origin in the United States (H), believing it is important to 
maintain a Hispanic culture in the U.S. (C), and believing that it is important 
to speak Spanish at home (S),  
 
(2) FH= FH(H, C, S) 
 
When solving to find an optimal level of remittances, R*, we find that a 
migrant’s optimal level of remittances, R*, depends on the relative importance 
that familism plays in her utility, δUM / δFH, the share size of her family utility 
compared to her own utility (γ), her propensity to remit (φ), her income level 
(M) and relative importance of her propensity to remit, which is directly 
impacted by how UF can positively affect UM. Likewise, her R* is negatively 
impacted by the migrant’s propensity to consume (α), the cost of her 
consumption basket (p, a proxy for inflation) and the cost of remittances 
(1+c).  
 










APPENDIX 3: REMITTANCE AMOUNT HISTOGRAM 
                              (Natural log of the values of sent remittances). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
